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 The Protestant Ethic and Modernity – Comparative 
Analysis with and beyond Weber 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
I. 
The major question I want to address here is what is the relevance of the »Protes-
tant Ethic« today (Weber 2004 (1904/1905))? Is it only or mainly an illustration of a 
brilliant, seminal work which was for a century a source of inspiration and writing – 
but which is no longer of great significance or relevance on the contemporary 
scene; and if it is of such significance, what is the nature of this significance? Is the 
concrete hypothesis it presented – namely that Protestantism constitutes an impor-
tant – even essential – component in the development of modern capitalism of any 
validity? But above all is its broader, in a sense central thesis, its broad civilizational 
theme – the claim that Protestantism is at the root of the modern civilization, of the 
»Rise of the West«, of full fledged capitalism of the Western rationality a problem so 
succinctly analyzed by Prof. Wolfgang Schluchter (1979, 1985a) – still valid, and if it 
is, can it be of any importance for the understanding of the contemporary world? 
Even if its basic claim about the crucial importance of Protestantism in the devel-
opment of the first Western European modernity, despite the many criticisms 
which have been voiced against it throughout the years, throughout the century – at 
least partially accepted, is this of any help in understanding the contemporary world, 
the world multiple modernities, of intensive globalization, a world which seemingly 
has gone to far beyond the premises of the classical narrative of modernity, beyond 
the vision of the nation and revolutionary states, a world of be it end of history or 
of clash of civilizations? 
Is the world of multiple modernities, of globalization related in any way to We-
ber’s vision or is it contradictory to Weber’s visions, and especially to the ways in 
which the Protestant Ethic thesis has been interpreted in the recent decades and 
which read this essay as attempting to explain the origins of the specific mode of 
rationalization that developed in the West. 
This reading of Weber in the fifties and sixties gave rise to a search for the pos-
sibility of finding some equivalents of the Protestant Ethic in other civilizations – 
one of the best, and first, of which has been Robert N. Bellah’s »Tokugawa Relig-
ion« (1957) – assuming, even if often only implicitly, that it is only in so far as such 
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equivalents of the Protestant Ethic do develop in these civilizations they will really 
become modern. Many recent developments – be it in South America or South Asia 
or analysis of social capital in different countries of Europe, have indeed shown that 
religious developments in the direction of the Protestant ethic, i.e. in this worldly 
ascetic direction do indeed contribute to the development of economic entrepre-
neurship (Yuchtman-Yaar/Alkalay 2005), even if it is not always clear which aspects 
of Protestantism that are of importance in this context – is it the belief in predesti-
nation, ascetic orientations; the emphasis on individual responsibility; or rather the 
sectarian organizations and disciplines? But even if these interpretations are valid, 
they do not explain the development of modern civilizations and above all also of 
different patterns of modernity, of multiple modernities that develop in these socie-
ties.  
If one emphasizes only this reading of Weber it is seemingly irrelevant to the 
contemporary world of multiple modernities. There is however another reading of 
Weber’s work, which is indeed highly relevant for the understanding of the con-
temporary world. This is the reading of the »Gesammelte Aufsätze für Religions-
soziologie« as studies of the internal dynamics of the various Great Civilizations, in 
their own terms, in terms of their distinctive rationalities, with a special emphasis on 
the role of heterodoxies and sectarian movements in these dynamics. Truly enough 
Weber focused his analysis on the development of the first – Western, European – 
modernity – and did not conceive the possibility of the development of other mod-
ernities – but neither did he necessarily assume that the later ones will necessary 
develop under the same conditions. Accordingly such reading of Weber almost 
naturally leads the question of how these dynamics, the specific historical experi-
ence of these civilizations may influence – certainly not determine – some of the 
distinct characteristics of the modernities that develop in the frameworks of these 
civilizations. The kernels of such analysis can indeed be found in the series of We-
ber symposia edited by W. Schluchter (1981, 1983, 1984, 1985b, 1987, 1988) and 
those on the Axial civilizations (Eisenstadt 1987a, 1987b, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 
2000), and I would like here to follow these indications and expand on them, em-
phasizing the comparison between the development of the first modernity within 
one Axial civilization, with modernities which developed with other Axial civiliza-
tions and which can also be applied to non-Axial one – namely Japan (Eisenstadt 
1996).  
By claiming the relevance of such reading of Weber to the analysis of the con-
temporary society, of the contemporary world, I do not mean to imply that what is 
called for is a sort of exegetic reading of Weber as providing some direct explana-
tions of different contemporary developments – even if such reading may often be 
of interest – but rather the possibility of learning from Weber’s approach to com-
parative civilizations, from his basic analytical and methodological insights – re-
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membering indeed that his approach constituted an unparalleled, probably the most 
forceful comparative sociological-historical approach developed in sociology. 
In this context of great importance is the fact that Weber’s Religionssoziologie con-
stituted an analysis of the dynamics of a special type of civilization, Weber did not 
focus on the analysis of the Ancient Egyptian or Assyrian civilizations, of various 
South Asian and even of the Japanese ones. The religious or civilizational orienta-
tions of these civilizations did not constitute an inherent part of his Religionssoziologie 
– although he often referred to them in his analyses of structures of power, or of 
economic formations. In Religionssoziologie he focused on the analysis of a special 
type of civilizations of world religions – of what later Alfred Weber and above all 
his colleague Karl Jaspers, would call the »Axial Civilizations«, and on their different 
yet comparable dynamics (Jaspers 1953; Weber 1960 (1935)).  
Contrary to some interpretations of Weber, as well as to later Orientalist ap-
proaches and the criticisms thereof, as well as in many ways contrary to Marx’s 
analysis of the Asian mode of production, Weber did not assume that the »non-
Western« civilizations he studied – Ancient Judaism, Chinese and Indian ones – 
were stagnant or even regressive, as against the dynamics of the Western world, 
which led via Protestants to the development of modernity, of an overall distinct 
type of rationality, encompassing all spheres of life – and generating its own ten-
sions and antinomies. Rather his work constitutes an analysis of the dynamics of 
these civilizations – of dynamics which went in distinct ways, different from but 
comparable with those of the Western one. Or, to put in another way, he did not 
assume that most of these non-Western civilizations were non-reflexive, purely 
magical non- rational ones, but rather that there developed within them specific 
types of reflexivity, of rationality, above all different combinations of »Wert« and 
»Zweckrationalität«, different modes of rationality which generated different modes 
of institutional dynamics. It was indeed such different modes of rationality, with the 
tensions inherent in them, that generated different conceptions of »salvation«, of 
the implementation of the transcendental visions prevalent in these civilizations, 
that constituted, according to him, one at least of the motors of such dynamics.  
Such a perspective necessitates a somewhat new look at Europe. If we do not 
assume that all the different structural, institutional and cultural characteristics of 
modernity, of modern society as they crystallized in Western Europe have been, as 
it were naturally, transplanted into other societies or civilizations and constitute the 
natural and only model of modernity, it is necessary to identify those dimensions of 
European modernity which may seem distinctly European, and to examine to what 
extent they are related to, or influenced by, some distinct aspect of European his-
torical experience. Or, in other words, it necessitates a closer look at some of the 
distinct characteristics of the historical experience of European societies, of Euro-
pean Axiality, as they may bear on the development of the distinct characteristics of 
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the first – European – modernity, and of the distinct historical and structural con-
ditions which were conducive to the development of these characteristics (Eisen-
stadt 1987c). 
There is yet another additional methodological problem closely related to the 
evaluation of Weber’s vision. Weber has been often accused, wrongly, of cultural 
determinism, of being a culturologist who believes that cultural visions constitute 
the driving force of human history. Although this accusation has been often – and 
indeed thoroughly refuted, yet it has been raised again and again. Does any en-
dorsement of the Protestant Ethic thesis imply the acceptance of a methodologi-
cally »idealist« or »culturalist« as against more »materialist« or realist approach – an 
endorsement which probably would even make it less relevant for the understand-
ing of the contemporary world, the world framework of global, geopolitical and 
economic competition? The examination of the relevance of Weber’s vision for the 
contemporary world will also throw some light on this problem.  
The Multiplicity of Axial Civilizations and of World Histories 
II. 
The starting point of our exploration is the analysis of the implications of the We-
berian analysis of the Axial Civilizations. The core of the specific »Axial« develop-
ments has been the combination between two strong tendencies. The first such 
tendency was, to follow Johann Arnason’s formulation – between a radical  
»distinction between ultimate and derivative reality (or between transcendental and mundane 
dimensions, to use a more controversial formulation)« (…) »connected with an increasing orienta-
tion to some reality beyond the given one; with new temporal and spatial conceptions; with a 
radical problematization of the conceptions of cosmological and social order, and with growing 
reflexivity and second order thinking, with the resultant models of order generating new problems 
(the task of bridging the gap between the postulated levels of reality)« (Arnason et al. 2005). 
The second tendency was the development on the structural level of far-reaching 
decoupling of many aspects of social structure, and their disembeddment from 
relatively closed kinship or territorial units; the concomitant development of many 
free-resources which can be organized or mobilized in many different ways, consti-
tuting challenges for the hitherto institutional formations.  
The development of the conceptions of a chasm between the transcendental 
and the mundane orders gave rise in all these civilizations to attempts to implement 
some aspects of such vision in the mundane world, to reconstruct the mundane 
world human – personality and the socio-political and economic orders according 
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to the prevalent transcendental vision, formulated in religious, metaphysical and/or 
ethical terms (Eisenstadt 1986; Arnason 2005).  
The core of tendencies to the reconstruction of mundane life was the develop-
ment of conceptions of a world beyond the immediate boundaries of their respec-
tive societies – leading to the constitutions of broader institutional frameworks. The 
most important among such broader institutional formations that developed within 
all Axial civilizations in connection with the visions promulgated by them were very 
strong tendencies to the constitution of societal center or centers to serve as the 
major autonomous and symbolically distinct embodiments of the transcendental 
visions of ultimate reality as the major loci of the charismatic dimension of human 
existence, and to the attempts to permeate the periphery and restructure it accord-
ing to their own autonomous visions, conceptions, and rules. 
Second, concomitantly, there developed with the institutionalization of the vari-
ous Axial cultural programs, strong tendencies to define certain collectivities and 
institutional arenas as the most appropriate ones to be the carriers of the distinct 
broader transcendental visions, and of new »civilizational« – often ›religious‹ – col-
lectivities, which were distinct from existing political various ›primordial‹, ›ethnic‹, 
local, or religious ones, yet they continually impinged on them, interacted with 
them, and challenged them, generating continual reconstruction of their respective 
identities. 
But while such center or centers and collectivities emerged as distinct symbolic 
and institutional arenas, their »givenness« could no longer be always taken for 
granted; the very constitution and characteristics of these centers tended to become 
a focus of reflexivity and of concomitant contestations focused on a critical exami-
nation of the existing social and political order and to some extent also of its prem-
ises (Eisenstadt/Silber 1988; and see also Seligman 1989). Such reflexivety and 
contestations were reinforced by the continual development of tensions and an-
tinomies as inherent components of the Axial visions. 
The most important of such antinomies were those focused first on the aware-
ness of a great range of possibilities of transcendental visions and of the range of 
ways of their possible implementation; second, on the tension between reason and 
revelation or faith (or their equivalents in the non-monotheistic Axial civilizations); 
and third, on the problematic of the desirability of attempts at full institutionalisa-
tion of these visions in their pristine form, as against the recognition that given the 
fragility of human nature, such attempts are not only unrealisable but also danger-
ous. Such reflexivity was connected with the development of new patterns of cul-
tural creativity, above all of theological or philosophical discourse that flourished 
and became constructed in much more elaborate and formalized ways, organized in 
different worlds of knowledge in manifold disciplines, and generating continual 
developments within such frameworks. Such reflexivity and contestations were 
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reinforced by the central development of the antinomies and tensions as inherent 
components of the Axial visions.  
III. 
These new visions were promulgated by specific bearers or carriers, of »Kul-
turträger« autonomous cultural and religious or secular carriers of models of cultural 
and social order – such as the ancient Israelite prophets and priests and later on the 
Jewish sages, the Greek philosophers and sophists, the Chinese literati, the Hindu 
Brahmins, the Buddhist Sangha, and the Islamic Ulema. These groups constituted a 
new social element, a new type of elites which were differed distinctly from the ritual, 
magical and sacral specialists in the pre-Axial civilizations. These new elites – the 
intellectuals and clerics – were recruited and legitimized according to distinct, 
autonomous criteria, usually promulgated by themselves, and were organized in 
autonomous settings distinct from those of the basic ascriptive or political units of the 
society. Usually they acquired potential countrywide status consciousness of their 
own. It was these elites that constituted the most active elements in the restructuring 
of the world, in the development of the new ›civilizational‹ formations and the con-
comitant new patterns of collective identity and world visions of new types of cen-
ters, institutional creativity that developed in these societies.  
In all these civilizations there developed a multiplicity of secondary cultural, po-
litical or educational elites, each very often carrying different conceptions of the 
cultural and social order. Accordingly the institutionalization of these Axial visions 
was never a simple peaceful process. It has usually been connected with struggle 
and constitution between many groups and their respective visions. The very multi-
plicity of such alternative visions gave rise to an awareness of the uncertainty of 
different roads to implementation of such visions, of the possibility of existence of 
alternative conceptions of social and cultural order, and of the seeming arbitrariness 
of any single solution. Such awareness was closely related to the development of a 
high degree or »second order« thinking, i.e. of reflexivity turning on the basic 
premises of the social and cultural order. 
One of the central foci of such contestations focused, to use the terminology 
proposed by Boltanski, around the criteria of justification of different modes of 
activities and institutional formats – be it of economic institution or also of the 
criteria of accountability of rulers. One of the major breakthroughs of Protestant-
ism, leading presumably to the modernity, has been as Ilana Silber has pointed out, 
the radical change in the justification of different types of mundane activities, in-
deed of the endorsement of different mundane above all economic activities and 
organizations with their charismatic aura, as the carriers or embodiment of the 
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charismatic dimensions of their respective cosmological vision (Boltanski/Thevenot 
1983; 1991; 1999; Silber 2003).  
IV. 
The different modes of reflexivity that developed in these civilizations focused to a 
large extent, although certainly not only on the constitution of the political order – 
the crux of which was the transformation of the conception of the accountability of 
rulers. The political order as one of the central loci of the mundane order was usu-
ally conceived as lower than the transcendental visions and had to be reconstituted 
according to the precepts of the latter, and the rulers were usually held responsible 
for organizing the political order according to such precepts.  
At the same time the nature of the rulers was greatly transformed. The King-
God, the embodiment of the cosmic and earthly order, disappeared, and a secular 
even with strong social attributes ruler, in principle accountable to some higher 
order, appeared. Thus emerged the conception of the accountability of the rulers 
and the community to a higher authority, God or Divine Law. One such dramatic 
appearance appeared in the priestly and prophetic pronunciations of Ancient Israel. 
A different, »secular«, conception of such accountability, to the community and its 
laws, appeared in the northern shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, in Ancient 
Greece, and also in the Chinese conception of the Mandate of Heaven. 
V. 
The general tendency to the reconstitution of the world, with all its symbolic-ideo-
logical and institutional repercussions, and to continual expansion was common to 
all the Axial Age civilizations but they differed greatly with respect to the concrete 
ways in which these tendencies developed and became institutionalized within 
them.  
Two sets of conditions were of special importance in shaping the different 
modes of institutional creativity and of expansion of these civilizations. One such 
set consists of variations or differences in their basic cultural transcendental visions 
or orientations. The other is the structure of the social arenas in which these insti-
tutional tendencies can be played out. 
Among the different cultural orientations the most important have been first the 
differences in the very definition – religious or secular – of the tension between the 
transcendental and mundane orders and in the modes of resolving this tension. 
Second, within the religious context, there was the distinction between the mono-
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theistic religions in which there was a concept of God standing outside the Universe 
and potentially guiding it, and those systems, like Hinduism and Buddhism, in 
which the transcendental, cosmic system was conceived in impersonal, usually 
metaphysical terms, and in a state of continuous existential tension with the mun-
dane system. A third major distinction refers to the focus of the resolution of the 
transcendental tensions, especially between purely this-worldly, purely other-worldly 
and mixed this – and other – worldly transcendental visions, visions of »salvation« 
(a distinctly Christian term employed by Weber – but one which can be extended, 
with important qualifications, to other religions or civilizations). 
But the concrete working out of all tendencies, the concrete institutional pat-
terns that developed in different Axial societies, depended on the second set of 
conditions – namely the arenas in which these broad institutional tendencies can be 
implemented. These conditions included, first, the respective concrete economic 
political-ecological settings, especially whether they were small or great societies, 
whether they were societies with continuous compact boundaries, or with cross-
cutting and flexible ones. Second was the specific historical experience of these 
civilizations and societies, including encounters with other societies, especially in 
terms of mutual penetration, conquest, or colonization.  
It is the interplay between, on the one hand, the different cultural orientations, 
their carriers, and their respective visions of restructuring of the world, and on the 
other hand, the concrete arenas and historical conditions in which such visions 
could be concretized, that has shaped the institutional contours and dynamics that 
developed in the different Axial Age civilizations, and the subsequent courses of 
world histories. 
VI. 
The development, on the one hand, of different cosmological conceptions and, on 
the other hand, of growing structural differentiation and the concomitant develop-
ment of free resources took place in different Axial societies to some extent at least 
independently of one another, generated by the internal momentum of these di-
mensions of social order – albeit continually reinforcing one another in a variety of 
ways. Neither the cosmological visions nor the patterns of structural differentiation 
determined each other. At most there developed certain affinities between different 
institutional implications which are generated by the openness of both the cosmo-
logical visions as well as of structural differentiation and the concomitant develop-
ment of free resources. Accordingly there developed within these civilizations, 
multiple constellations of collective identities and of political and economic forma-
tions, each with its own dynamics.  
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Indeed all these dimensions of the social order – be it political formations, con-
stitution of collective identity, or economic formations – as they developed in Axial 
civilizations or societies were autonomous, to a larger extent independent of, even if 
closely interwoven with each other and especially with the distinctive Axial cos-
mologies. 
Thus indeed within the framework of Axial civilizations there developed a great 
variety of political frameworks – be it full-fledged empires – indeed a very great 
variety thereof (be it Chinese, Byzantine or Ottoman); rather fragile kingdoms or 
tribal federations (e.g. ancient Israel); combinations of tribal federations of city-
states (e.g. ancient Greece); the complex decentralized pattern of the Hindu civili-
zation; or the imperial-feudal configurations of Europe.  
Moreover the relations between different collectivities and political, economic 
formations, the contestations and struggles between their respective carriers – con-
stituted a continual aspect of the dynamics of Axial civilizations, giving rise to the 
concretization of different institutional patterns, to different – as it were – institu-
tional »choices« and to continual contestations about these patterns. The concreti-
zation of any such choice, which could be, as was the case of China long-lasting or, 
as in other cases, of a much shorter span, was influenced by a variety of historical 
contingencies which certainly were not fore-ordained in either the cosmological 
vision or the »original« ecological settings of the respective societies. Nor did they 
constitute some sort of universal evolutionary stages. Rather such programs and 
patterns were shaped as is indeed also the case with other institutional formations in 
the history of mankind, by the continuous interaction between several factors – the 
most important among which are, first the basic premises of cosmic and social 
order, the basic »cosmologies« that were prevalent in these societies in their »ortho-
dox« and »heterodox« formulations alike as they have crystallized in these societies 
throughout their histories. A second shaping factor was the pattern of differentia-
tion between the different dimensions of the social order and of institutional for-
mations that developed within experience. The third set of factors shaping such 
programs and historical experiences was the internal tensions, dynamics and contra-
dictions that developed in the basic Axial premises of these Axial civilizations in 
conjunction with the structural-demographic, economic, and political changes at-
tendant on the institutionalization of Axial frameworks. In this context of special 
importance was the fact that the Axial cosmological programs were continually as it 
were born by internal tensions and antinomies, which as we have seen above, were 
inherent in them.  
Such continual reconstitution of different combinations between cosmological 
visions and structural characteristics, of different structures of power and of collec-
tive identities, has been in Axial civilizations reinforced by the fact that with the 
institutionalization of Axial Civilizations, a new type of inter-societal and inter-civi-
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lizational world history emerged. To be sure, political and economic interconnec-
tions existed, as we have indicated already above, between different societies 
throughout human history. Some conceptions of a universal or world kingdom 
emerged in many pre-Axial civilizations, like that of Genghis Kahn, and many cul-
tural interconnections developed between them, but only with the institutionaliza-
tion of Axial Civilizations a more distinctive ideological and reflexive mode of ex-
pansion developed (Biran 2004). Within all these civilizations there developed, in 
close connection with the tendencies to reconstruct the world, a certain propensity 
to expansion, in which ideological, religious impulses were combined with political 
and to some extent economic ones. Although often radically divergent in terms of 
their concrete institutionalization, the political formations which developed in these 
civilizations – which can be seen as ›ecumenical‹ – comprised representations and 
ideologies of quasi-global empire, and some, at moments in their history, even the 
facts of such Empire. This mode of expansion also gave rise to awareness of creat-
ing possible ›world histories‹ encompassing many different societies. But neither a 
homogeneous world history emerged nor were the different types of civilizations 
similar or convergent. Rather, there emerged a multiplicity of different, divergent, 
yet continuously mutually impinging world civilizations, each attempting to re-
construct the world in its own mode, according to its basic premises, and either to 
absorb the others or consciously to segregate itself from them. 
VII. 
The preceeding analysis of some aspects of the dynamics of Axial Civilization while 
going beyond the concrete concerns of Weber in his Religionssoziologie yet builds very 
much on some of the basic components of his approach, especially on the emphasis 
on the importance of sectarian groups and heterodoxies in the constitution of such 
dynamics, and of contingent historical circumstances in the concretization of insti-
tutional patterns.  
This analysis bears also very closely on the analytical problem of the relations 
between »culture« and social structure – on the allegation of Weber as a culturolo-
gist, reinforcing all the refutations of such allegations. Weber did not conflate as was 
the case with many Marxists and with Foucault (1975; 1988) power and culture; 
rather throughout his works he attempted to specify how the basic ontological 
premises, especially conceptions of the transcendental visions, visions of salvation, 
prevalent in a society, influence – but do not determine the contours of specific 
institutional patterns – such as the structure of rulership or configurations of strata 
– as well as the mechanism through which such influence is exerted. He did not 
assume that these conceptions and premises directly shape institutional patterns, but 
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rather that they open up specific ranges of institutional possibilities, and that the 
concrete institutional patterns which develop within these ranges crystallize through 
human agency, through the inter-relation between these premises as promulgated by 
their different carriers, and the different »real« »material« forces as they come to-
gether in different historical contexts in the constitution of which contingency plays 
a central role. His strong emphasis on the importance among such carriers of het-
erodoxies indicates that such challenges are influenced not only by pure »power« 
contestation but also by the basic premises of the different religions or systems of 
belief and knowledge that became hegemonic in their respective societies, and that 
such premises, especially when institutionalized, contain within them seeds of po-
tential challenge – and transformation.  
The Comparative Analysis of Modernity: Multiple Modernities – 
The Basic Problematic 
VIII. 
What is the significance, if any, of such interpretations of Weber’s comparative 
civilizational analysis for the analysis of modernity, especially indeed of the contem-
porary world of multiple modernities and intensive globalization? After all, Weber’s 
conception of modernity was deeply rooted in the Western-European tradition, and 
it can be easily interpreted as assuming that European modernity is the only possi-
ble one, even if some reading of his analysis of the Americas can be interpreted as at 
least implicitly recognizing the possibility of some diversity of modernities. But 
above all Weber’s Europecentrism, of course, is manifest in his claim that it was 
only Western modernity that constituted the only development of universal, world 
historical significance. Given the fact that it was only within the imperialist, coloni-
alist and capitalist expansion that Western modernity expanded throughout almost 
the entire world, this assertion is, of course, true in the narrow factual sense. But 
obviously this assertion does not take into account the world historical orientations 
and claims of the Axial Great Religions – and is, of course, entirely out of tune with 
the contemporary situation – and here again it may be seen that Weber’s analysis of 
modernity may not be relevant for the understanding of the contemporary world. 
But at the same time there is, I think, another side or another answer to the 
question of whether Weber’s analysis of modernity is relevant to the analysis of the 
world of multiple modernities in the age of globalization. Of central importance in 
this context Weber’s implicit recognition of modernity as a distinct civilization 
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constitutes a very important starting point such analysis of multiple modernities – 
even if the concretization of these implications necessarily brings us beyond Weber. 
IX. 
The view of multiple modernities entails certain assumptions about the nature of 
modernity. The first is that modernity is to be viewed as a distinct civilization, with 
distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. Or, in contrast to the view of mod-
ern societies – as the natural culmination of at least hitherto evolution of human 
society, this view assumes that modernity constitutes a distinct civilization – which 
originated in the West and then expanded throughout the world, in some ways 
similar to the crystallization and expansion of the Great Religions – Christianity, 
Islam, Buddhism and even Confucianism (Eisenstadt 2002; 2005).  
The second such assumption is that this civilization, the distinct cultural pro-
gram with its institutional implications, which crystallized first in Western Europe 
and then expanded to other parts of Europe, to the Americas and later on through-
out the world, gave rise to continually changing cultural and institutional patterns 
that constituted different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in 
the core characteristics of the distinct civilizational premises of modernity, i.e. that it 
gave rise not to a relatively uniform and homogeneous civilization but, indeed, to 
multiple modernities. 
According to this view, the core of modernity is the crystallization and devel-
opment of mode or modes of interpretation of the world, or, to follow Cornelius 
Castoriadis’ terminology, of a distinct social »imaginaire«, a combination of distinct 
ontological vision, of a distinct cultural program, combined with the development 
of a set or sets of new institutional formations – the central core of both being, an 
unprecedented openness and uncertainty (Castoriadis 1987).  
This central core of the cultural program of modernity has been indeed possibly 
most succinctly formulated by Weber. To follow James D. Faubian’s exposition of 
Weber’s conception of modernity: »Weber finds the existential threshold of moder-
nity in a certain deconstruction: of what he speaks of as the ›ethical postulate‹ that 
the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically ori-
ented cosmos.«  
What he asserts – what in any event might be extrapolated from his assertions – 
is that the threshold of modernity has its epiphany precisely as the legitimacy of the 
postulate of a divinely preordained and fated cosmos has its decline; that modernity 
emerges, that one or another modernity can emerge, only as the legitimacy of the 
postulated cosmos ceases to be taken for granted and beyond reproach. Counter-
moderns reject that reproach, believe in spite of it.  
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»(…) One can extract two theses: Whatever else they may be, modernities in all their variety are 
responses to the same existential problematic. The second: whatever else they may be, modernities 
in all their variety are precisely those responses that leave the problematic in question intact, that 
formulate visions of life and practice neither beyond nor in denial of it but rather within it, even in 
deference to it. (…)« (Faubian 1993) 
All such responses leave the basic problematic of modernity intact, the reflexivity 
which developed in the program of modernity went beyond those that crystallized 
in the Axial Civilizations. The reflexivity that developed in the modern program 
focused not only on the possibility of different interpretations of the transcendental 
visions and basic ontological conceptions prevalent in a society or societies but 
came to question the very givenness of such visions and of the institutional patterns 
related to them. It gave rise to the awareness of the existence of multiplicity of such 
visions and patterns and of the possibility that such visions and conceptions can 
indeed be contested. 
The major recurpersion of this program was first that the premises and legiti-
mation of the social, ontological and political order were no longer taken for 
granted; and that concomitantly there developed within this program of a very 
intensive reflexivity around the basic ontological premises as well as around the 
bases of social and political order of authority of society – a reflexivity which was 
shared even by the most radical critics of this program, who in principle denied the 
legitimacy of such reflexivity.  
The possibility of such contestation was intensified by the fact that the cultural and 
political programme of modernity, was from its very beginning be set by internal 
antinomies and contradictions, which constituted a radical transformation of those 
that were inherent in Axial civilizations. The transformation of the Axial antinomies 
in the cultural program of modernity was closely related as they were to the various 
metanarratives of modernity – to follow E. Tiryakian (1996) – the Christian, the 
Gnostic and the chthonic, came to question some of its basic premises. The most 
important among these antinomies focused first on the evaluation of major dimen-
sions of human experience, and especially on the place of reason and as against the 
more expressionist dimensions of human nature, society and history; second, on the 
concomitant problem of the nature of bases of true morality and autonomy; third, 
on the tension between reflexivity and active construction of nature and society; 
fourth, between totalizing and pluralistic approaches to human life and the consti-
tution of society; and fourth, between control and autonomy, or discipline and 
freedom, giving rise to continual critical discourse and contestations which focused 
on the relations, tensions and contradictions between its premises. Beyond these 
tensions between the different premises of the modern cultural and political pro-
gramme of modernity there developed those which focused on the contradiction 
between the basic premises and antinomies of the cultural and political programs of 
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modernity and the institutional development of modern societies – and which have 
indeed been most successfully analyzed by Weber – especially in his discourse of 
»Entzauberung« and the Iron Cage (Mitzman 1969).  
X. 
These characteristics of the modern program entailed a radical transformation of 
the conceptions and premises of the social and political order, of the constitution 
and definition of the political arena, of collectivities and of human personality. The 
core of the new conceptions was, first of all, the breakdown of traditional legitima-
tion of the political order, the concomitant opening up of different possibilities for 
the constitution of such order, and the consequent contestation about how political 
order was to be constituted to no small extent by human actors.  
The same basic dynamics developed also with respect to the distinctive mode of 
constitution of the boundaries of collectivities and collective identities that devel-
oped in modern societies. The most distinct characteristic thereof, very much in line 
with the general core characteristics of modernity, was that such constitution was 
continually problematized. Collective identities were no longer taken as given or as 
preordained by some transcendental vision and authority, or by perennial customs. 
A central component in the constitution of modern collective identities was the 
self-perception of a society and its perception by other societies as »modern«, as the 
bearer of the distinct modern cultural and political program – and its relations from 
this point of view to other societies – be it those societies which claim also to be – 
or are seen as – bearers of this program, and various »others« (Eisenstadt 1999a, b). 
Parallel tendencies developed within the modern program with respect to the 
promulgation first of very distinctive conceptions of the formation of human per-
sonality, of the civilized person, emphasizing the autonomy of man and of the im-
portance of the self – of its autonomy and self-regulation, and second with respect 
to the symbolic definitions, usually couched in highly ideological terms, of the rela-
tions between different arenas of life such as a family and occupation, work, and 
culture; between public and private realms; between different life-spaces; between 
different age-spans; between the sexes; between different social classes and of the 
different spaces of social and cultural life.  
All these characteristics of the cultural program of modernity entailed to follow 
Claude Leforte’s terminology, »the loss of the markers of certainty« (Lefort 1988). Such 
loss of markers of certainty inherent in the modern political and cultural program and – 
to go beyond Leforte – search for their restoration in the major institutional arenas of 
modern societies and in the constitution of human personality. 
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XI. 
These basic characteristics of modernity, the loss of markers of certainty and the 
search for their reconstitution was common to all modern societies – the concrete 
ways in which they crystallize differed greatly between different modern societies, 
giving rise to different orders of modernity, to multiple modernities. 
Most of these variations and changes of the institutional and cultural contours 
of modernity were closely related to the continual expansion thereof – an expansion 
which went far beyond the expansion of Axial civilizations. This expansion 
spawned a tendency – rather new and practically unique in the history of mankind – 
to the development not only visions of universal rule but also of universal, world-
wide institutional and symbolic frameworks and systems (Wallerstein 1974; 
Tiryakian 1985). The expansion of modern civilization which took place first in 
Europe and then beyond it continually combined economic, political, and ideologi-
cal aspects and forces, and its impact on the societies to which it expanded was 
much more extensive and intensive alike than in most historical cases. Above all it 
spawned a tendency – rather new and practically unique in the history of mankind – 
to the development of worldwide institutional, cultural and ideological frameworks 
and systems each based on some of the basic premises of this civilization, and each 
rooted in one of its basic cultural and institutional dimensions. All of these frame-
works were multi-centered and heterogenous, each generating its own dynamics, in 
constant mutual interrelations to others. The interrelations among them have never 
been »static« or unchanging, and the dynamics of these international frameworks or 
settings gave rise to continuous changes in various modern societies. Of special 
importance in the shaping of these dynamics was that the expansion of modenity 
and constitution of the multiple international, world systems took place above all 
through imperial and colonial expansion. The experience of colonialization, of 
being colonialized and of the confrontation with colonial powers and with colonial-
ism constituted a continual component of the collective identities of many the 
modern, of the different modernities that developed attendant on the expansion of 
modernity. 
It was within these different historical contexts that there developed the great 
variety of modern or modernizing societies, sharing many common characteristics 
but also evincing great differences among themselves, the variety of multiple mod-
ernities.  
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XII. 
Or, in other words, these different cultural programs and institutional patterns of 
modernity were not shaped, as was assumed in some of the earlier studies of mod-
ernization as natural evolutionary potentialities of these societies – indeed, poten-
tially of all human societies; or, as in the earlier criticisms thereof, by the natural 
unfolding of their respective traditions; or just by their placement in the new inter-
national settings. Rather they were shaped by the continuous interaction between 
several factors, indeed by those factors which have been, as we have already indi-
cated above, exphasized by Weber in his historical analysis, but which have acquired 
distinct characteristics in the modern scene.  
Following these considerations, the relation of Axial civilizations to modernity 
should be reconsidered, the emergence of modernity should not be seen as a natural 
outflow or outgrowth of the potentialities inherent especially in European Axiality, 
but indeed following Weber’s general insights into comparative history, of very 
much indeed in line Weber’s analysis of different historical formations – which first 
by basic premises of cosmic and social order, the basic »cosmologies« that were 
prevalent in these societies in their »orthodox« and »heterodox« formulations alike 
as they have crystallized in these societies throughout their histories. A second 
shaping factor was the pattern of institutional formations that developed within 
these civilizations through their historical experience especially in their encounter 
with other societies or civilizations. 
The third set of factors shaping such program was the internal tensions, dy-
namics and contradictions that developed in these societies in conjunction with the 
structural-demographic, economic, and political changes attendant on the institu-
tionalization of modern frameworks, and between these processes and the basic 
premises of the modern civilizations, of the modern cultural and political program. 
Fourth, the different – continually changing – programs of modernity were 
shaped by the encounter and continual interaction between the processes men-
tioned above, and the ways in which the different societies and civilizations were 
incorporated into the new international systems – the ways in which they were 
placed or were able to place themselves, in these systems, to insert or become in-
serted into the global system.  
Fifth, such continually changing contours were shaped by the political struggles 
and confrontations between different states, and between different centers of politi-
cal and economic power. Such confrontations developed within Europe with the 
crystallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified 
with the crystallization of »world systems« from the sixteenth or seventeenth cen-
tury on.  
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Sixth, these contours changed in tandem with the shifting hegemonies in the differ-
ent international systems that developed concomitantly with economic, political, 
technological, and cultural changes.  
Seventh, such contours were shaped by the continual confrontation attendant 
on the expansion of modernity between the basic premises of this program and the 
institutional formations that developed in Western and Northern Europe and other 
parts of Europe and later in the Americas and Asia: in the Islamic, Hinduist, Bud-
dhist, Confucian and Japanese civilizations. 
It is in the nature of these factors that they have been continually changing – 
thus also giving rise to continual changes in the institutional and cultural contours 
of modernity. These institutional contours of modernities have been changing, first 
as a result of the internal dynamics of the technological, economic, political and 
cultural arenas as they developed in different societies and expanded beyond them. 
Second, these contours changed with the political struggles and confrontations 
between different states, and between different international centers of political and 
economic power. Third, these contours changed in tandem with the shifting he-
gemonies in the different international systems that developed concomitantly with 
economic, political, technological, and cultural changes. Fourth, such changes were 
rooted in the continual confrontations between on the one hand different interpre-
tations of the basic premises of modernity as promulgated by different elites and as 
institutionalized in different societies, and on the other hand the concrete develop-
ments, conflicts, and displacements that accompanied the institutionalization of 
these premises. These confrontations activated the consciousness of the contradic-
tions inherent in the cultural program of modernity and the potentialities conferred 
by its openness and reflexivity; and gave rise to the continual reinterpretation by 
different social actors of the major themes of this program, and of the basic prem-
ises of their civilizational visions, and of the concomitant grand narratives and 
myths of modernity. Such confrontations developed within Europe with the crys-
tallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified with 
the crystallization of »world systems« from the sixteenth or seventeenth century on.  
XIII. 
It was above all multiple social movements which developed within these societies 
and across them and which constituted to some extent transformations of Axial 
heterodoxies – that constituted – together, of course, with other social forces, above 
all the different elites; economic cultural and political activists – the most important 
actors in these changes of the contours of modernity. 
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The most important of such movements in the classical period of modernity, and 
which were of great importance in Weber’s analysis thereof were, of course, the 
socialist and national movements. These movements were indeed deeply rooted in 
the European tradition and in the colonial expansion of modernity, often becoming 
in totally transformed ways, constitutive elements of the crystallization of multiple 
modernities in the »classical« period of modernity, in the period of the constitution 
of nation and revolutionary states.  
One of the most radical changes in the contemporary historical context, in the 
context of multiple modernities and intensified globalization has been the develop-
ment and predominance of new types of social movements – such, on the one 
hand, various »post-modern« ones, such as among other ecological, women’s 
movements – and second, above all fundamentalist and communal-religious ones 
(Eisenstadt 1999a). 
These movements have reconstituted in new ways the problematic of modernity 
in new historical contexts and in new arenas. First among these new ways is the 
worldwide reach and diffusion (especially through the various media) of such 
movements and of the confrontations they entail; second their politicization and 
their continual interweaving with fierce contestations formulated in highly political 
ideologies and terms; and third, a crucial component of these reinterpretations and 
appropriations of modernity is the continual reconstruction of collective identities 
in reference to the new global context and contestations between them. This shift 
was connected with increasing confrontations in many societies, in local and global 
scenes and arenas, between the original Western conceptions of modernity as em-
bodied in the modern nation-state or revolutionary state, and the newly emerging 
local, regional, and transnational conceptions of collective identity.  
As against the seeming acceptance and of the premises of these programs, or at 
least a highly ambivalent attitude to them combined with the continual reinterpreta-
tion thereof, that was characteristic of the earlier – such as the various socialist, 
communist and national movements and regimes – the contemporary fundamen-
talist and most communal religious movements promulgate a seeming negation of 
at least some of these premises, as well as a markedly confrontational attitude to the 
West, sharing in a mirror way many themes with the post-modern ones. 
This highly confrontational attitude to the West, to what is conceived as Western, is 
very often in these movements closely related to their attempts to appropriate mod-
ernity and the global system on their own, non-Western, often anti-Western, mod-
ern terms, closely related to either attempts to decouple radically modernity from 
Westernization and to take away from the West the monopoly of modernity. Indeed 
this highly confrontational attitude to the West, to what is conceived as Western, is 
in these movements closely related to their attempts to appropriate modernity and 
the global system on their own non-Western, often anti-Western, modern terms. 
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Between these movements and between these different centers of power there 
developed central contestations. Such contestations may indeed be couched in »civili-
zational« terms – but these very terms are already formulated in terms of the discourse 
of modernity, defined in totalistic and absolutizing terms derived from the basic prem-
ises of this discourse, and they entail a continual transformation of these identities. 
Indeed the very pluralization of life spaces in the global framework may easily en-
dow them with highly ideological absolutizing orientations, and at the same time 
brings them into the central political arena. When such clashes or contestations are 
combined with political, military or economic struggles and conflicts they can indeed 
become very violent.  
XIV. 
These continual reinterpretations of modernity and contestations about them have 
been not static. In all these movements there developed a continuous reconstruc-
tion of various themes and tropes, attesting to the fact that the cultural program of 
modernity, constituted a common positive or negative reference point for all of 
them. In all societies these attempts at interpretation of modernity were continually 
changing under the impact of emerging historical forces. They changed from the 
major social movements that were predominant in long period of the predominance 
of the models of the Western and revolutionary states to the »post-modern« ones in 
the contemporary scene. In each of these periods there developed not just one 
model of modernity – but multiple models in the shaping of which the historical 
experiences and civilizational cultural heritage of their respective societies played a 
very important role as was the case already in Europe. 
All these developments do indeed attest to continual development of multiple 
modernities, or of multiple interpretations of modernity. 
Within all these movements the aggressive and destructive potentialities – mani-
fest in very strong aggressive and exclusivist tendencies and orientations; in the 
designation or naming of groups as the »enemies«, often to be excluded from the 
respective collectivities, even to their dehumanisation, and in strong anti-rational 
orientations and symbolism, and in the concomitant tendencies to the sanctification 
of violence, have become closely interwoven with the processes of dislocation, of 
contestation between interpretations of modernity, and with geopolitical struggles – 
making them more dangerous. 
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XV. 
The preceeding analysis of Axial civilizations and of multiple modernities went 
beyond the concrete concern of Weber’s analysis, but at the same time, however, it 
built on Weber in several distinct closely related ways. First they built on some of 
the basic components of his approach, especially on the emphasis on the impor-
tance of sectarian groups and heterodoxies in the constitution of such dynamics, 
and of contingent historical circumstances in the concretization of institutional 
patterns. Second, it built also on his general visions of constitution of civilizations, 
including the civilizational of modernity.  
Moreover this analysis bears also very closely on the analytical problem of the 
relations between »culture« and social structure – on the allegation of Weber as a 
culturologist, reinforcing all the refutations of such allegations. Weber did not con-
flate as was the case with many Marxists and with Foucault power and culture; 
rather throughout his works he attempted to specify how the basic ontological 
premises, especially conceptions of salvation and the like, prevalent in a society, 
influence – but do not determine the contours of specific institutional patterns – 
such as the structure of rulership or configurations of strata – as well as the mecha-
nism through which such influence is exerted. He did not assume that these con-
ceptions and premises directly shape institutional patterns, but rather that they open 
up specific ranges of institutional possibilities, and that the concrete institutional 
patterns which develop within these ranges crystallize through human agency, 
through the inter-relation between these premises as promulgated by their different 
carriers, and the different »real material« forces as they come together – in different 
historical contexts in the constitution of which contingency plays a central role. His 
strong emphasis on the importance among such carriers of heterodoxies indicates 
that such challenges are influenced not only by pure »power« contestation but also 
by the basic premises of the different religions or systems of belief and knowledge 
that became hegemonic in their respective societies, and that such premises, espe-
cially when institutionalized, contain within them seeds of potential challenge – and 
transformation.  
Accordingly, this analysis also indicates the relations between culture and social 
structure, history and structure, human agency and structure, as well as between 
order-maintaining versus order-transforming dimensions of culture. 
Beliefs and cultural visions are basic elements of the social orders, of crucial im-
portance in shaping their institutional dynamics. Beliefs or visions become such 
elements by the assimilation and transformation of their content into the basic 
premises of patterns of social interaction, that is, into clusters of regulative princi-
ples governing the major dimensions of social roles.  
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One of the most important processes through which beliefs or visions are trans-
formed into such regulative principles is the crystallization of models of cultural and 
social order and of codes. This closely resembles Weber’s concept of »economic 
ethics« which specify how to regulate the frameworks of concrete social organiza-
tions and institutional settings, the patterns of behavior and the range of major 
strategies of action appropriate to different arenas. 
Such transformations of religious and cultural beliefs into »codes« or »ethics«, 
into models for a social order is effected through the activities of visionaries, them-
selves transformed into elites exercising different modes of control and who then 
form coalitions and counter-coalitions with other elites. Such dynamics are not 
limited to the exercise of power in the narrow political or coercive sense. As even 
the more sophisticated Marxists, especially Gramsci, have stressed, they are perva-
sive and include many relatively autonomous symbolic aspects; they represent dif-
ferent combinations of »ideal« and »material« interests. Such measures of control, as 
well as the challenges to them among elites and broader strata, shaped class rela-
tions and modes of production. 
The institutionalization of such cultural visions, social processes and mecha-
nisms of control, as well as their »reproduction« in space and time, necessarily gen-
erate tensions and conflicts, movements of protest and processes of change which 
offer certain opportunities to reconstruct the premises themselves. 
The potential of change and transformation is not accidental or external to the 
realm of culture. It is inherent in the basic interweaving of culture and social struc-
ture as twin elements of the construction of social order. Precisely because the 
symbolic components are inherent in the construction and maintenance of social 
order they also bear the seeds of social transformation. 
Such seeds are indeed common to all societies. Yet the actual ways in which 
they work out, the configurations of liminal situations, of different orientations and 
movements of protest, of modes of collective behavior and their impact on socie-
ties within which they develop, vary greatly between societies giving rise to con-
trasting social and cultural dynamics. But new civilizational settings and social or-
ganizations, whether the Axial civilizations, those that ushered in modern order in 
the West, or the great revolutions, are not »naturally« brought about by the basic 
tenets of a religion. Rather, they arise out of a variety of economic and political 
trends, as well as ecological conditions, all interrelated with the basic civilizational 
premises and with specific institutions. 
Many general historical changes, especially the constructions of novel institu-
tional orders, were probably the outcome of factors listed by James G. March and 
John Olsen (1989). These are the combination of basic institutional and normative 
forms; processes of learning and accommodation and types of decision-making by 
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individuals in appropriate arenas of action in response to a great variety of historical 
events. 
As Said Arjomand has pointed out, the crystallization of any pattern of change is 
the result of history, structure and culture, with human agency bringing them to-
gether. It is also human agency, as manifested in the activities of institutional and 
cultural entrepreneurs, and their influences on different sectors of society, that 
shapes actual institutional formations. The potential for the crystallization of such 
formations is rooted in certain general societal conditions, such as degrees of 
structural differentiation or types of political economy. But these are only poten-
tials, the concretization of which is effected through human agency. 
It is the different constellations or configurations of these factors that are the 
major objects of comparative historico-sociological analysis and discourse. 
Thus, as the concrete contours of the contemporary situation naturally differs 
greatly from those of the societies Weber studied – as do also these specific dy-
namics – yet this analysis, while going beyond Weber, builds very much on his vi-
sion and insights.  
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